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The Gap-Filling Role of Private
Environmental Governance: A
Case Study of Semiconductor
Supply Chain Contracting
ABSTRACT
Three of the principal international agreements that govern
various aspects of hazardous substances or wastes are not
legally binding on American companies because the US
Congress has not passed the requisite implementing legislation.
The failure of American companies to meet or exceed the
standards set forth in these agreements, although not legally
mandated, could be detrimental to American businesses
operating on the global stage. The American semiconductor
industry responded to this potential disconnect by developing
internal firm-specific standards that bind suppliers through
supply chain agreements. This Note explores the phenomenon of
private standard setting in the semiconductor industry, a prime
example of private environmental governance. It seeks to explain
how, if at all, private standard setting in the semiconductor
industry reflects, undercuts, or fills gaps inherent in the law
governing this area in the United States. After looking closely at
these standards, this Note recommends two general approaches
that will improve upon the current firm-specific toxics
standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Companies must conform to various standards of conduct,
stemming from domestic legal requirements, foreign laws and the
norms of the countries in which they operate, and rules and
regulations promulgated by a wide array of influential non-
governmental organizations. To the extent those norms and laws are
reflected in international environmental agreements that have not
been implemented in the United States, American companies are
vulnerable to legal challenge or decreased business opportunities if
they comply only with domestic legal requirements.
Enter private environmental governance, which interacts with
public environmental governance in a variety of ways, including
supplementing, superseding, undermining, or simply filling in gaps
inherent in many public efforts. Instead of merely reacting to
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continually evolving global environmental standards, semiconductor
firms have embraced private environmental governance by
proactively implementing self-regulating standards to minimize any
adverse impact external intervention might have on their supply
chains and manufacturing operations more generally. These self-
regulating standards are not uniform across the semiconductor
industry; instead, individual manufacturers develop their own
standards with which they then require their suppliers to comply.
The objective of this Note is to determine the role supply chain
contracting plays in private environmental governance, primarily by
analyzing the documents governing toxic chemicals that accompany
supply chain agreements. In addition, this Note relies on
sustainability reports, annual reports, and other publicly available
information provided by American semiconductor firms that
illuminate how these firms communicate the presence of toxics in
their supply chains to the public and how they attempt to regulate
those toxics. This Note details the primary mechanism several key
firms in the semiconductor industry use to regulate toxics through
their supply chains, examines possible reasons these firms might be
policing the toxic chemicals in their supply chains, and concludes that
the private regulation of toxics through supply chain contracts fills
gaps created by the US government's failure to implement
international toxics agreements, at least at the federal level.
Additionally, this Note highlights the firm-specific nature of these
standards and recommends a uniform approach across the
semiconductor industry, or a broader approach across manufacturers
more generally. As an alternative to uniform standards, this Note
proposes the creation of a database to compile the various firm-
specific requirements, which would eliminate some of the burden
individualized firm standards put on suppliers serving multiple firms
or even multiple industries.
II. FOCUSING IN ON THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
A. Introduction to the Semiconductor Industry
The semiconductor industry majorly impacts the everyday lives
of citizens spanning most of the globe. Semiconductors are the
microchips that control all modern electronics.' Although these
microchips are safe in their manufactured, useful form, large
1. About Semiconductors: Semiconductors Improve Our Lives, SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUS. ASS'N, http://www.semiconductors.org/semiconductors/semiconductors-improve
our_1ives/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5LP2-3YT3] (archived Oct. 9,
2016).
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amounts of high-grade chemicals are used to produce them,
2
including: highly corrosive hydrochloric acid; volatile solvents like
toluene, benzene, methyl chloroform, and acetone; toxic gases
including arsine; and metals including arsenic, cadmium, and lead.
3
Unsurprisingly, many of the chemicals utilized, including those listed
above, and the waste they ultimately produce, are hazardous.
4 As a
result, these chemicals are regulated under a number of international
agreements, domestic laws, and increasingly by manufacturers
themselves through supply chain agreements with the companies
that supply their raw materials and component parts.
B. Why Does This Industry Serve as a Fitting Case Study?
The American semiconductor industry may serve as an
instructive case study in private environmental governance because it
generates tremendous profits and has achieved great success in
producing more efficient, better-performing electronic components
while simultaneously developing more sustainable manufacturing
processes.5 In 2015, the global semiconductor industry generated
USD 335 billion in sales.6 The American semiconductor industry has
the largest market share in the global semiconductor industry,
2. The interested reader can find a simple schematic of the semiconductor
manufacturing process on Intel's website. From Sand to Silicon "Making of a Chip"
Illustrations, INTEL CORP. (May 2009), http://download.intel.com/pressroom/
kits/chipmaking/Making-of a-Chip.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRH9-2PXB] (archived Mar.
3, 2018).
3. Ron Chepesiuk, Where the Chips Fall: Environmental Health in the
Semiconductor Industry, 107 ENVT'L HEALTH PERSP. A452, A454 (1999).
4. For example, the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards lists the
following as symptoms that can occur following toluene exposure: "irritation eyes, nose;
lassitude (weakness, exhaustion), confusion, euphoria, dizziness, headache; dilated
pupils, lacrimation (discharge of tears); anxiety, muscle fatigue, insomnia; paresthesia;
dermatitis; liver, kidney damage." NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH, NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgd06l9.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2018)
[https://perma.cclJY2G-YTCH] (archived Feb. 19, 2018).
5. Note that half of the semiconductor firms that serve as the focus of this
analysis made Newsweek's "Top Green Companies in the U.S. 2015" list. Essdras M.
Suarez, Top Green Companies in the U.S. 2015, NEWSWEEK,
http://www.newsweek.com/green-2015/top-green-companies-u.s.-
2015 (last visited Jan.
14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8JG3-KRVC] (archived Jan. 31, 2018). Two of the fourteen
companies-Analog Devices and Intel Corporation-also made Forbes's "The World's
Most Sustainable Companies 2017." Jeff Kauflin, The World's Most Sustainable
Companies 2017, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jeffkauflin/2017/01/17/the-worlds-most-sustainable-companies-2017/#1fd914
2 3 4e9 d
[https://perma.cc/FF8S-HQ8A] (archived Jan. 31, 2018). Forbes's list contains 494
companies; Intel sits in the 63rd Spot, while Analog Devices is number 78. Id.
6. Global Semiconductor Sales Top $335 Billion in 2015, SEMICONDUCTOR IND.
ASS'N, http://www.semiconductors.org/news/2016/02/01/global-sales-report_2015/
global semiconductor-sales-top-335_billion in201
5 / (last visited Jan. 14, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/AEX2-JY2K] (archived Jan. 14, 2018).
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controlling over 50 percent of the market.7 Further, electronics
constitute the single largest American export category, worth more
than USD 120 billion per year, and semiconductors are a key
component of almost all electronic products.8  Exports , of
semiconductor components themselves, worth USD 43 billion, were
second only to the export value of automobiles and aircraft.9 United
States-based semiconductor industry global sales have seen an
average annual rate of increase of 14.6 percent over the twenty-year
period from 1994 to 2014.10
Of particular relevance to supply chain contracting, the US
semiconductor industry conducts about 52 percent of its
manufacturing in the United States.1 ' Since not every raw material
needed in semiconductor manufacturing is readily available in the
United States, American semiconductor companies are importing raw
materials (and, in some cases, pre-manufactured components or
component parts) into the United States. 12
III. GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
This Note explores three international agreements that govern
aspects of hazardous substances or wastes: the Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes of
1989 (the Basel Convention), the Rotterdam Convention on Prior
Informed Consent of 1998 (the Rotterdam Convention), and the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 2001 (the
Stockholm Convention). These Conventions differ from each other in
a number of ways, but for this analysis, the key difference is the way
in which they choose which substances to regulate and, consequently,
the substances they ultimately cover. These agreements-and the US
Congress's failure to implement them-illustrate the gap between
international law and domestic law that creates a challenge for
American companies that operate on the international stage.
7. The U.S. Semiconductor Industry: 2015 Factbook, SEMICONDUCTOR IND.
Ass'N 3, http://www.semiconductors.org/semiconductors/2015 sia factbook/ (last visited
Jan. 14, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6585-UT3D] (archived Feb. 19, 2018) (follow "Download
the complete PDF"' hyperlink).
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 7.
12. See, e.g., Alexander C. Kaufman, How Intel Eliminated War from Its Supply
Chain, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2016, 3:56 PM ET), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/intel-conflict-free-mineralsus_569520e5e4b05b3245da6ea7 [https://perma.cc/
GD36-6NUP] (archived Jan. 31, 2018) (discussing the steps Intel took to find
alternative sources of materials when it learned it may have been inadvertently
funding the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo through its purchase of
minerals and metals).
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A. The Basel Convention
On March 22, 1989, the Basel Convention was adopted in
response to public outcry following the discovery that developed
countries were depositing toxic wastes in Africa and other parts of the
developing world.1 3 The Basel Convention seeks to "protect human
health and the environment against the adverse effects of hazardous
wastes"'4 by prohibiting trade in such wastes when (1) the importing
country fails to provide written consent; or (2) the exporting country
has reason to believe that the particular wastes will not be handled in
an environmentally sound manner.15 The Basel Convention covers an
array of "hazardous wastes" that were selected by the drafters based
on their source, composition, and characteristics, plus "other wastes,"
a category that includes household waste and incinerator ash.1
6 These
"other wastes" are not generated by the semiconductor industry, and
are included in this description of the Basel Convention solely for the
sake of completeness. Wastes may be deemed "hazardous wastes" for
the purpose of the Basel Convention if they (1) are both listed in
Annex I and possess any of the hazardous characteristics contained in
Annex III,17 or (2) are considered to be hazardous wastes by the
domestic legislation of the exporting, importing, or transit party.'
8
The Basel Convention prohibits the export of any hazardous or
other waste until the importing and transit nations have authorized
the transport in writing.' 9 The authorization process requires the
participant countries, the disposer, and the exporter to share
information regarding the waste itself, including the nature and
amount, and the contract specifications governing waste
management.20 Under the Basel Convention, the parties themselves
independently choose whether to prohibit the import of hazardous or
other wastes into their respective counties.2 ' If a party chooses to
13. See The Convention: Overview, BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int/
TheConvention/Overview/tabid/1271/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/39XS-WNQS] (archived Oct. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Basel Convention
Overview] (noting that at the time of its adoption the goal was to combat the "toxic
trade").
14. Id.
15. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal art. 4, ¶¶ 1(c), 2(e), Mar. 22, 1989, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 102-5, 1637 U.N.T.S. 57.
16. Basel Convention Overview, supra note 13.
17. Put differently, under the Basel Convention, it is not enough to be listed in
Annex I to be deemed a "hazardous waste"; wastes listed in Annex I must also possess
a hazardous characteristic listed in Annex III to be subject to regulation. Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, supra note 15, art. 1.
18. Id.
19. Id. art. 6.
20. Id.
21. Id. art. 4, 11.
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prohibit such imports, it is then prohibited from exporting said
waste.2 2 Since the parties themselves ultimately decide whether to
prohibit the import of a particular hazardous waste, scientific
considerations play, at most, an indirect role and are subject to the
individual country's values, resources, and priorities.
B. The Rotterdam Convention
The Rotterdam Convention, adopted on September 10, 1998,
seeks to protect human health and the environment by encouraging
cooperation and facilitating information-sharing between parties in
the international trade of certain hazardous materials.2 3 A party in
each of two separate "Prior Informed Consent regions" must ban or
severely restrict a chemical and notify the Secretariat of the ban or
restriction before the chemical can be evaluated for addition to the
Convention.24 The seven "Prior Informed Consent regions" were
adopted solely to effect the purposes of paragraph 5 of Article 5 of the
Convention, which describes the procedures for listing chemicals to
the Convention, and are arranged logically by geographic region.25 By
requiring notification from two separate regions, the Convention aims
to target widely used chemicals; otherwise, the list could be filled
with chemicals of concern to a particular region that are not used
elsewhere.26
The notification must include (1) the chemical's common name,
according to an internationally recognized nomenclature, and trade
names; (2) information on the hazard classification if the chemical is
subject to such classification requirements; (3) use of the chemical;
and (4) physico-chemical, toxicological, and ecotoxicological
properties.2 7 The notifications are then sent to the Chemical Review
22. Id. art. 4, ¶1(b).
23. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade art. 1, Sept. 10,
1998, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 106-21, 2244 U.N.T.S. 337; The Convention: Overview,
ROTTERDAM CONVENTION, http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/Overview/tabid/1044/
language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/62PG-BJS2]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Rotterdam Convention Overview].
24. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, supra note 23,
art. 5; Rotterdam Convention Overview, supra note 23.
25. Countries: PIC Regions, ROTTERDAM CONVENTION, http://www.pic.int/
Countries/PICRegions/tabid/1070/language/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15,
2018) [https://perma.cc/B6WM-9GZW] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
26. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, supra note 23,
art. 5. Pesticides are evaluated under a different procedure, which will not be discussed
here since pesticides are not involved in semiconductor manufacturing. See id. art. 6.
27. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, supra note 23, at
annex I.
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Committee for consideration.28 Paragraph 6 of Article 18 of the
Convention specifies, "Membership of the Committee shall consist of
a limited number of government-designated experts in chemicals
management."29 The Committee evaluates the notifications in
accordance with the criteria set out in Annex II of the Convention,
which ensures both the integrity of the data and that the Committee
has considered the effect of the final regulatory action chosen.
3 0 The
Committee then makes a recommendation regarding whether the
chemical should be made subject to the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure.3 ' The Chemical Review Committee does not have the final
word on whether a particular chemical will be listed in Annex III, the
repository of chemicals that are regulated under the Convention.
32
Instead, the Committee generates a draft decision that is forwarded
to the Conference of the parties where the final decision is made.
3 3
Here, too, science is considered in conjunction with other factors that
countries weigh differently depending on their particular values and
priorities.
C. The Stockholm Convention
The Stockholm Convention seeks to regulate persistent organic
pollutants in a way that protects human health and the
environment.3 4 The precautionary approach set forth in the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, which sought to guide
signatories in future sustainable development,35 significantly
influenced this goal. Persistent organic pollutants, commonly referred
to as "POPs," are carbon-based chemical substances that, by virtue of
their chemical and physical properties, remain in the environment for
significant periods of time, gradually spreading throughout the
environment.36 These chemicals accumulate in fatty tissues,
biomagnify-or increase in concentration-as they move through the
food chain, and are toxic to both humans and wildlife.
3 7 Due to their
28. Id. art. 5.
29. Id. art. 18.
30. Id. at annex II.
31. Id. art. 5.
32. Id. art. 7.
33. Id.
34. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 1, May 22,
2001, S. TREATY DOc. No. 107-5, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119.
35. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12,
1992).
36. The Convention: What are POPs?, STOCKHOLM CONVENTION,
http://chm.pops.int/TheConvention/ThePOPs/tabid/673/Default.aspx (last visited Jan.
15, 2018) [https:l/perma.ccl6H75-E9EJ] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
37. Id.
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long lifespans, toxicity, and mobility, POPs are of particular interest
to regulators.
A party seeking listing or targeting of a particular chemical by
the Stockholm Convention must submit a proposal to the Secretariat
containing the information specified in Annex D.3 8 Annex D requires
that the requesting party include the following items in the proposal:
(1) chemical identity, which includes names and structure;
(2) persistence, which includes evidence that the chemical is
"sufficiently persistent to justify its consideration within the scope of
this Convention"; (3) bio-accumulation, which includes the bio-
concentration factor, monitoring data, or other data showing the
chemical "presents other reasons for concern"; (4) potential for long-
range environmental transport, which may include monitoring data
or modeling data; and (5) evidence of adverse effects or toxicity data
that shows listing of the chemical is appropriate under the
Convention.3 9 The three separate annexes where chemicals are listed
require different mitigating actions from the parties. Parties must
take steps to eliminate the production and use of chemicals listed in
Annex A, to restrict the production and use of chemicals listed in
Annex B, and to reduce the unintentional releases of chemicals listed
in Annex C.40
The Persistent Organic Pollutant Review Committee, composed
of chemical assessment or management experts, evaluates an initial
proposal to determine whether it provides all of the information
required by Annex D. 41 If the Committee finds that the threshold
criteria has been met, it then creates a draft risk proposal in
accordance with Annex E.4 2 If the Committee finds that the proposed
chemical falls within the objective of the Convention, it then requests
information on socio-economic considerations, provided for in Annex
F.4 3 Only after all three phases are complete can the Committee
recommend whether the chemical should be considered for listing in
Annex A, B, and/or C.44 The Conference of the parties then makes the
final decision regarding listing.45 The Stockholm Convention differs
from the Basel and Rotterdam Conventions because the reviewing
committee evaluates both the scientific and socio-economic
information, following a process more closely aligned with the
analysis the parties themselves will conduct.
38. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, supra note 34,
art. 8.
39. Id. at annex D.
40. Id. arts. 3, 5, 6.
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D. Where These Conventions Stand in the United States
The United States signed all three conventions-the Basel
Convention in 1990, the Rotterdam Convention in 1998, and the
Stockholm Convention in 2001.46 However, the US Congress has not
yet passed implementing legislation for any of the conventions, which
is required before the President can ratify them.4
7 As such, none of
the conventions discussed above are binding on US companies as a
matter of domestic law.
The US position with respect to these Conventions stands in
stark contrast to that of the rest of the world. One hundred and
eighty-six countries ratified the Basel Convention.4 8 While fewer
countries ratified the Rotterdam Convention and the Stockholm
Convention, 160 and 182, respectively,49 they, too, received
overwhelming support from countries spanning the globe.
E. Summary of the Governing International Environmental
Agreements
The three agreements described above together represent
international efforts to control the movement of hazardous wastes, to
facilitate information sharing about hazardous characteristics of
certain chemicals, and to eliminate production or limit unintentional
releases of persistent toxic chemicals. But none of the three
46. Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/chemicalpollution/8301
6 .htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/GXZ2-Y8WH] (archived Jan. 15, 2018); Rotterdam Convention on the
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/
chemicalpollution/83010.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cclK3MH-
Y3GB] (archived Jan. 15, 2018); Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/eloes/eqt/
chemicalpollution/83009.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/D2YY-M3F5]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018).
47. Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes, supra note 46; Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals
and Pesticides in International Trade, supra note 46; Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, supra note 46. Note that the Senate gave its advice and
consent to ratification of the Basel Convention but not the Stockholm or Rotterdam
conventions.
48. See Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, BASEL CONVENTION,
http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/PartiesSignatories/tabid/4499/Def
ault.aspx#enotel (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/WYJ7-FGTN] (archived
Jan. 15, 2018).
49. See Status of Ratifications, ROTTERDAM CONVENTION, http://www.pic.int/
Countries/Statusofratifications/tabid/1072/anguage/en-US/Default.aspx (last visited
Jan. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/RN29-29881 (archived Jan. 15, 2018); Status of
Ratification, STOCKHOLM CONVENTION, http://chm.pops.int/Countries/
StatusofRatifications/PartiesandSignatoires/tabid/4500/Default.aspx (last visited Jan.
15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Q932-AS9X] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
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agreements has been fully implemented in the United States, which
means they are not binding on US companies as a matter of domestic
law. This creates a problem for global industries like the
semiconductor industry because companies that are located in
countries that have signed on to these three Conventions are required
to manage their supply chains in compliance with the three
agreements, but American companies need not comply with the
requirements set forth in any of the agreements. This could make it
difficult to reach agreed upon terms when the companies governed by
the Conventions enter into contracts with American companies.
A simple hypothetical illustrates the disconnect: Company X is
contracting with Company Y to supply Company Y with its required
supply of titanium. Company X is located in a country with highly
protective environmental laws; Company Y is located in a country
with only minimally protective environmental laws. If Company X
individually drafted its ideal supply chain agreement and Company Y
did the same, the two agreements would look very different.
Presumably, the agreement drafted by Company X would include
much more stringent environmental requirements than the
agreement drafted by Company Y because Company X is subject to
stricter environmental requirements. This disagreement over
applicable environmental standards might disqualify Company Y as
one of Company X's suppliers or, at the very least, it will add another
dimension to negotiations, potentially requiring Company Y to enact
costly improvements in order to make doing business with Company
X a possibility.
How have the companies that make up the American
semiconductor industry responded to this disconnect? They have
begun to establish internal toxics standards that govern supply chain
contracts with their suppliers. This Note will address these internal
standards in the latter section of Part IV.
IV. Private Environmental Governance in the Electronics Industry
A. What Function Does Private Environmental Governance Serve?
In the absence of new environmental statutes, private entities,
including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations,
have developed mechanisms that drive environmental improvement,
a function formerly typical of government regulators.5 0 Private
environmental governance, the term for these efforts by non-
governmental entities, is "a new model of legal and extralegal
influences on the environmentally significant behavior of corporations
50. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 129, 133 (2013).
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and households."5 ' In other words, private environmental governance
is a phenomenon wherein interactions between private entities create
environmental requirements that govern corporate and household
behavior, ultimately influencing environmental quality.
52 Private
entities have adopted a variety of mechanisms geared toward
reducing environmental degradation, including collective standard
setting, certifications, and supply-chain agreements.
53
Private approaches to environmental improvement are a
response to a variety of social, economic, and legal incentives; one of
the most significant driving forces is consumer preference for
sustainable practices.54 Professor Michael Vandenbergh has
described the process by which consumer preferences influence
corporate behavior as follows:
[I]ndividuals act on [their] preferences through their private market
behavior. .. or through their behavior as employees and managers of firms.
These preferences are both reflected by and stimulated by NGOs, which also
facilitate the application of pressure on private firms. Private firms respond by
participating in collective standard setting with other private parties . . . and
by unilaterally adopting internal firm standards . . . . The private standards
then affect the firms' decisions about which products or services to buy, and in
many cases are included as express provisions in contracts.
5 5
Companies also adopt private approaches to environmental
improvement for economic reasons.56 Many realize that "'greener'
technology is actually more cost effective due to factors such as lower
regulatory burdens, fewer control requirements, reduced waste costs
and positive market differentiation."57 Further, some companies are
embracing more sustainable practices in response to events over
which they have no control but that directly impact their bottom line.
For example, Coca Cola began to accept the idea that climate change
threatened its economic livelihood when the company lost a lucrative
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Deborah P. Majoras, A Summit on Private Environmental Governance:
Facing the Challenges of Voluntary Standards, Supply Chains, and Green Marketing,
44 ENVT'L. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10120, 10120 (2014); see also Lesley K.
McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENvT'L & ADMIN. L. 291, 293
(2014) (providing examples of private regulation, including the establishment of codes
of conduct in supply chain agreements, voluntary programs that certify and label
products meeting specified social and environmental criteria, and the use of private
auditors to assess corporate compliance with private and public standards).
54. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private
Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 921 (2007).
55. Id. at 921-22.
56. Pam Eliason, To Detox Manufacturing, Businesses Find a Secret
Ingredient, GREENBIz (Dec. 19, 2016, 1:01 AM), https://www.greenbiz.comlarticle/detox-
manufacturing-businesses-find-secret-ingredient (last visited Jan. 21, 2018)
[https://perma.cclKB5E-38D2] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
57. Id.
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operating license in India in 2004 because the country experienced a
serious water shortage.58 Nike had a similar experience in 2008 when
floods temporarily shut down four of its factories in Thailand; it, too,
began speaking out about the extreme weather that disrupted its
supply chain.59
Internal factors may also encourage companies to adopt private
environmental controls. Corporate sustainability goals, which more
companies set for themselves each year,60 increasingly require that
companies make deliberate, significant strides toward more
environmentally and socially responsible activities, including
commitments to safer alternatives for toxic chemicals.61 Whatever
motivates a particular company or organization, efforts in the realm
of private environmental governance have grown significantly in
recent years.62
The recent emergence of private governance generally-not only
as it relates to environmental concerns-was in large part a response
to the evolution of the global economy in two principle regards.6 3
First, global production has largely shifted from the developed world
to the developing world.64 This evolution has forced international
companies to take note of the working conditions and business
practices in the developing world. Second, the organization of global
production has changed significantly.6 5 Historically, manufacturers
were largely domestic enterprises or multinational corporations based
in developed countries that generally owned all or most of their
foreign factories.66 Now, international production networks consisting
of lead firms-often located in developed countries-control many
aspects of their suppliers' operations-often located in developing
countries.6 7 Much like the shift of manufacturing from the developed
to the developing world, this web of global production requires
companies headquartered in the developed world but operating
globally to ensure they understand practices in the developing world.
58. Coral Davenport, Industry Awakens to Threat of Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/science/earth/threat-to-
bottom-line-spurs-action-on-climate.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018)
[https://perma.ccW8KQ-Z9KR] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
59. Id.
60. See VELISLAVA IVANOVA, SuSTAINABLITY GOALS THAT MAKE AN IMPACT 2
(2013) (noting the increase in the number of corporations setting and publicly
disclosing sustainability goals in the preceding five years).
61. Eliason, supra note 56.
62. Private Environmental Governance, supra note 50, at 140-41.
63. Gary Gereffi & Frederick Mayer, Regulation and Economic Globalization:
Prospects and Limits of Private Governance, 12 BUs. & POL., no. 3, 2010, at 3.
64. Id.
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Consumer demand, however, often compels companies to go one
step further. Consumers want more socially responsible products and
brands-those sourced without conflict minerals68 and child labor
69 -
and are increasingly willing to pay more for those products.
70 This
leads companies to actively seek to improve various aspects of their
suppliers' businesses, in addition to their own.
Although the term "regulation" is traditionally understood as
referring to requirements put in place by government, a much
broader view of regulation-one that includes a role for private
standard-setting, coalition-building, and other private efforts-is
emerging in current academic parlance.71 This emerging view defines
regulation as "any process or set of processes by which norms are
established, the behavior of those subject to the norms monitored or
fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms for
holding the behavior of regulated actors within the acceptable limits
of the regime."7 2 Private standards, therefore, are filling areas that
were overlooked, either intentionally (as is the case with standards
that limit their scopes, usually for reasons of feasibility) or by virtue
of a country's failure to adopt relevant standards (as is the case with
international agreements that regulate toxic chemicals but, as yet,
unimplemented in the United States). Therefore, private standards
are playing the role traditionally reserved for governmental
regulation.
68. See Michael Kramer, Why Care About Conflict Minerals? Consumers and
Investors Do, GREENBIz (Feb. 26, 2015, 2:25 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/
article/why-care-about-conflict-minerals-customers-and-investors-do (last visited Jan.
22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SFZ9-9HMG] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) ("Companies that
profit from abuses of people and nature are irresponsible, and this way of generating
revenue . . . is coming to an end because more consumers demand corporate
responsibility.").
69. See, e.g., James Epstein-Reeves, Consumers Overwhelmingly Want CSR,
FORBES: THE CSR BLOG (Dec. 15, 2010, 9:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/
2010/12/15/new-study-consumers-demand-companies-implement-csr-programs/
#43acbbf765c7 (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/J3JH-Z7AG] (archived Jan.
22, 2018) (reporting that "83% of employees would seriously consider leaving their jobs
if their employers used child labor in sweatshop factories").
70. See Green Generation: Millennials Say Sustainability is a Shopping
Priority, NIELSEN CO. (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/
2015/green-generation-millennials-say-sustainability-is-a-shopping-priority.html (last
visited Jan. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SNL2-BVF6] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (reporting
that the percentage of respondents aged 15-20 who are willing to pay for products and
services made or delivered by socially and environmentally conscious companies is up
from 55% in 2014 to 72% in 2015).
71. McAllister, supra note 53, at 298-99.
72. Id. at 299-300 (citing Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space:
Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design, PUB. L., Summer 2001, at 329, 331).
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B. The Growing Role of Private Environmental Governance in Supply
Chain Contracting
Supply chain agreements offer environmentally conscious
companies an ideal opportunity to prescribe conduct and standards
with which their suppliers must comply. Since these are contractual
agreements, their terms are binding on the parties. Additionally, both
parties can benefit from the establishment of a long-lasting
relationship, so the manufacturer has an incentive to set clear
expectations and suppliers want to perform to the manufacturers'
expectations.73 These features-the binding nature of contractual
agreements and the suppliers' desire to supply materials or
components long-term-make supply chain contracting an ideal area
for companies to exercise private environmental governance.
One reason why semiconductor industry supply chain
agreements are particularly suited for analysis in this context is that
highly successful brand-name merchandisers-for instance, Apple
and Google, whose products all rely on semiconductors-play a
powerful role in dictating the way supply chains operate by requiring
suppliers to meet certain standards.74 Some successful brands wield
so much power that they are able to transform entire industries.
One timely example of such an effort is the partnership between
Google and the Healthy Building Network (HBN), who have
collaborated to develop Portico, a green materials database and a
decision-making tool through which they hope to transform the
building industry.7 5 HBN's predecessor to Portico began "as a
database of materials and [what is] in them [and] eventually evolved
into an information-gathering tool to help systematize chemical
disclosure requests from manufacturers."7 6 Although advocates for
greener building have been calling for changes in the industry for
years, HBN hopes that Google's strong purchasing power-and its
role in creating Portico-will persuade manufacturers to make
healthier building products.7 7
The phenomenon of private environmental governance in supply
chains and as a broader effort to influence environmentally friendly
behavior is not exclusive to the semiconductor industry or highly
successful brands. It appears in other forms, ranging from initiatives
73. Gereffi & Mayer, supra note 63, at 4 ("[L]ead firms enjoy some measure of
market power over suppliers and some ability, therefore, to affect their behavior.").
74. Gary Gereffi & Joonkoo Lee, Why the World Suddenly Cares About Global
Supply Chains, 48 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 24, 27 (July 2012).
75. Diana Budds, Google's Plan to Make Our Buildings Less Poisonous, FAST
Co. (Feb. 6, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.fastcodesign.com/3066686/googles-plan-to-
make-our-buildings-less-poisonous (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/NQ6T-
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to combat climate change to efforts to sustainably manage world
fisheries. A few examples that highlight the various roles private
environmental governance can play and prospects for success
follow. 7 8
1. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol's Scope 3 Standard
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol developed the Corporate Value
Chain Accounting and Reporting Standard, also referred to as the
Scope 3 Standard, to provide a standardized step-by-step approach
that would help companies and other organizations prepare a
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions inventory that includes indirect
emissions resulting from "value chain activities."
7 9 The inclusion of
upstream and downstream activities that emit GHGs builds on the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol's existing standards to help companies
better understand their Scope 3 emissions, which sometimes
represent a company's largest source of emissions.8 0
Kraft Foods, a company that participated in the Scope 3
Standard pilot project,81 offers an interesting example. Kraft
conducted its first Scope 3 inventory using relevant average industry
data from various public and commercial sources, an approach that
kept costs low while providing the company with a baseline of Scope 3
emissions that it can improve upon as information becomes available
from its own suppliers.82 Kraft found that Scope 3 emissions account
for more than 90 percent of the company's total emissions.
83 At an
even more granular level, the company found that the subcategory,
purchased goods and services, which includes raw materials,
78. The enthusiastic reader may be interested in learning about the Forest
Stewardship Council (FSC), another example of private environmental governance that
unfortunately will not be discussed here. The FSC established sustainable forestry
goals included complying with applicable laws, respecting the rights of indigenous
peoples, and conserving biodiversity. For more information, visit https://ic.fsc.org/en
[https://perma.cc/W647-LC8N] (archived Feb. 19, 2018).
79. Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting Standard,
Supplement to the GHG Protocol Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard,
GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL 4 (Sept. 2011), http://www.ghgprotocol.org/standards/
scope-3-standard [https://perma.cc/QFL6-AEWZ] (archived Feb. 19, 2018) [hereinafter
Scope 3 Standard]. In this context, value chain "refers to all of the upstream and
downstream activities associated with the operations of the reporting company,
including the use of sold products by consumers and the end-of-life treatment of sold
products after consumer use." Cynthia Cummis, VIDEO: Leading Companies Use New
Standards to Uncover Greatest Sources of Carbon Emissions, WORLD RESOURCES
INSTITUTE (June 28, 2012), http://www.wri.org/blog/2012/06/video-leading-companies-
use-new-standards-uncover-greatest-sources-carbon-emissions [https://perma.cc/2JXM-
LV3W] (archived Feb. 25, 2015).
80. Scope 3 Standard, supra note 79, at 5.
81. Id. at 71. For a complete list of road testers for the standard, see id. at 143
(listing IBM Corporation as a road tester).
82. Id. at 71.
83. Id.
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accounted for 70 percent of its total Scope 3 emissions; transportation
and distribution, energy-related activities, and the use of sold
products accounted for most of the remaining 30 percent.84
Should Kraft and other companies decide to pursue a complete
Scope 3 emissions analysis, they will need to collect emissions data
from their suppliers, because that data forms the basis for a
particular company's Scope 3 emissions. Companies can use the Scope
3 inventory to encourage supplier GHG measurement and reduction.
Further, since the company reporting the Scope 3 emissions has an
interest in reducing those emissions, the development of the
inventory will likely encourage the company to engage the supplier,
and potentially even consumers through product retailers, in talks
about how to reduce emissions.8 5
After quantifying and evaluating the sources of Scope 3
emissions, companies have the information necessary to achieve cost
savings, improve overall supply chain efficiency, reduce regulatory
risks, and strengthen supplier and consumer relationships.86
Companies that sign on to the Scope 3 Standard are choosing to take
responsibility for their emissions at all levels of business, not because
the government mandates it, but because, as discussed above, they
have determined that doing so makes smart business sense for their
own unique reasons.87
The Scope 3 Standard accounts for indirect GHG emissions,
which are not covered by the existing federal GHG reporting rule.88
Because these can account for a substantial amount of a company's
emissions, current federal standards leave a significant gap; the
Scope 3 Standard can fill this gap via private environmental
governance. Since the Standard is voluntary, it may seem tenuous to
argue that it serves a gap-filling function as opposed to a
supplementary one. However, a more in-depth analysis reveals that
the Standard's voluntary nature does not automatically preclude its
classification as a gap-filler. The Standard seeks to influence the
behavior of companies and their suppliers through the disclosure of
information much like some existing public regulations, including the
84. Id.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id. at 15.
87. See id. at 13-15 (discussing the various that motivate companies to initiate
private efforts to improve environmental quality).
88. Information on the Federal GHG Reporting Rule can be found here:
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program and the U.S. Inventory of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks, ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/
greenhouse-gas-reporting-program-and-us-inventory-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-
sinks (last updated July 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/M6ZM-SV59] (archived Feb. 19,
2019) (noting that over 8,000 facilities reported GHG data to EPA for 2014, covering
approximately 85--90% of total U.S. GHG emissions).
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National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)8 9 and, more
pointedly, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act (EPCRA).90 To be clear, the Scope 3 Standard's reliance on
voluntary participation distinguishes it significantly from these
legally binding governmental regulations. However, the operation of
the standard, which drives company behavior through the disclosure
of information, makes the Scope 3 Standard function more like a gap-
filler than a supplementary mechanism.
2. The Marine Stewardship Council's Blue Label Sustainable Seafood
Initiative
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), which has been in
existence for almost twenty years, offers an additional example of a
highly successful private supply chain initiative.9 1 The MSC
publishes standards for sustainable fishing and seafood traceability.
Products that conform to these standards are recognized with a blue
MSC label, which communicates to consumers that the seafood was
caught according to the MSC's strict specifications.92 A fishery must
adhere to three core principles to receive MSC certification:
(1) maintenance of sustainable fish stocks; (2) minimization of
environmental impact; and (3) utilization of a management system
that is responsive to changing circumstances.
9 3
Once a fishery is certified as sustainable, the MSC Chain of
Custody Standard ensures that each company in the supply chain
that handles or sells an MSC certified product has a valid MSC Chain
of Custody certificate.94 Five core principles must be met for a
company to achieve Chain of Custody Certification: (1) the company
must purchase from a certified supplier; (2) the certified products
must be identifiable; (3) the certified products must be segregated;
(4) the certified products must be traceable, and the product volumes
must be recorded; and (5) the organization must have a management
89. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.
(West).
90. Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986
(EPCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 11001 et seq. (West).
91. Sustainable Seafood: the first 20 years, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://20-years.msc.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4STJ-3J4W]
(archived Jan. 22, 2018).
92. Our Approach, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://20.msc.org//what-
we-are-doing/our-approach (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/TK8K-62C2]
(archived Jan. 22, 2018).
93. MSC Fisheries Standard, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
https://www.msc.org/about-us/standards/fisheries-standard/msc-environmental-
standard-for-sustainable-fishing (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3T8X-
LRA8] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
94. MSC Chain of Custody * Standard, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
https://www.msc.org/about-us/standards/chain-of-custody-standard (last visited Jan.
22, 2018) [https://perma.cclT44T-LHUR] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
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system in place.9 5 This start-to-finish supply chain tracking assures
consumers that MSC-labelled products actually come from certified
sustainable fisheries.9 6 DNA testing reveals that over 99 percent of
MSC-labelled products are correctly labelled,9 7 which demonstrates
the effectiveness of the Chain of Custody Standard.
Certification to the MSC Fisheries Standard is voluntary,9 8 yet
the program enjoys wide participation;9 9 in this area, wide
participation equates to wide success. Two hundred eighty-one
fisheries in thirty-three countries have been certified as sustainable
according to the MSC Standard, and the total number of Chain of
Custody certificate holders almost tripled from 1,099 in 2010 to 2,898
in 2015.100 As with all voluntary programs, it is important to consider
what is driving participation. According to the MSC, "there is
evidence that fishers have gained a number of socioeconomic benefits
as a result of MSC certification, from higher revenues, to beneficial
partnerships and greater influence with governing institutions."101
Various studies found that MSC certification creates price premiums
in markets where the seafood is sold.1 02 Also, as discussed in the
context of personal electronics containing semiconductor devices,
consumer demand for "greener" products further supports the MSC's
sustainability efforts.10 3
In the context of sustainable fisheries, the MSC standards are
taking on a gap filling role for public environmental governance. The
MSC's standards are not the only ones that govern sustainable
fisheries, but the other standards are much more limited in scope,
leaving overall deficiencies. For instance, the European Union has
entered Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) with
over twenty nations worldwide,104 but the nations with the busiest
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Global Impacts Report 2016, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL 40,
https://www.msc.org/documents/environmental-benefits/global-impacts/msc-global-
impacts-report-2016 (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/M93Q-985G]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018) (tracing the impact of MSC from 1999 to 2015).
98. MSC Fisheries Standard, supra note 93.
99. See Global Impacts Report 2016, supra note 97, at 4, 9, 12.
100. See id. at 6 ("Today, almost 10% of the world's wild-caught fish is MSC
certified.").
101. Id. at 52.
102. See id. (citing a study indicating an estimated 10% price premium for MSC
certified haddock in UK supermarkets and another indicating an estimated 14.2% price
premium for MSC certified Alaskan pollock in the U.K.).
103. See Our Approach, supra note 92 (showing a diagram depicting the role
market demand plays in driving more fisheries to adopt sustainable practices).
104. See EU SFPAs: Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements, EUROPEAN
COMM'N, https://ec.europa.eulfisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/2015-sfpa-en.pdf
(last visited Jan. 22, 2017) [https://perma.ce/T8RQ-QLPA] (archived Jan. 15, 2018)
(showing that the EU currently has fourteen active bilateral fisheries agreements, two
reciprocity agreements, and six dormant bilateral agreements).
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ports-Peru, Indonesia, Korea, and Chile1 0
5-are noticeably absent
from those agreements.1 06 The United Nations has passed a
resolution on sustainable fisheries,1 0 7 but, as Gereffi and Mayer note,
the United Nations' enforcement bodies have extremely limited
powers.108 As a result, the MSC continues to play a vital role in filling
gaps left by public governance.
3. How is Private Environmental Governance Making an Appearance
in Semiconductor Industry Supply Agreements?
This analysis focuses on supply chain agreements, corporate
responsibility (or sustainability) reports, annual reports, and other
materials indicative of a company's position on supply sourcing for
the fourteen charter members of the Semiconductor Industry
Association.0" Eight of the fourteen charter members are also
members of the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), an
industry group dedicated to electronics supply chain responsibility.
110
105. Tim Huntington et al., Fishing Landings at the World's Commercial
Fishing Ports, J. OF OCEAN & COASTAL ECON., October 2015, at 6 tbl.1 (compiling a
global ranking of major fishing ports). Note that Russia had two fleets ranked in the
top ten but the country's landings were all attributed to domestic fleet and so it was
excluded from the list of countries that do not have agreements with the EU. Id. One
shortcoming of this metric is that it does not determine which of these countries
actually trade fish with the EU. The point, regardless, is that these major fishing
countries are not part of agreements requiring they utilize sustainable fishing
methods.
106. Note that any countries exporting fish to the European Union must be on
the European Union's list of approved countries. See What Requirements do Fish and
Seafood Products have to Comply with to be Allowed on the European Market?, CTR.
FOR THE PROMOTION OF IMPORTS (CBI), https://www.cbi.eulnode/1860/pdf/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LH5P-KFSW] (archived Jan. 15, 2018). Peru,
Indonesia, Korea, and Chile are all on all the European Union's list of authorized
countries. See Third Country Establishments, Section VIII: Fishery Products,
EUROPEAN COMM'N,
https://webgate.ec.europa.eulsanco/traces/output/non-eu_1istsPerActivity-en.htm (last
visited Jan. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/NE4G-XGYL] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
107. For an overview of the proceedings and the resolution, see General
Assembly Adopts Sustainable Fisheries Resolution, but Defers Action on Draft Text
Addressing Oceans, Law of Sea, UNITED NATIONS: MEETINGS COVERAGE AND PRESS
RELEASES (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gall599.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/866Z-BBL2] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
108. Gereffi & Mayer, supra note 63, at 5.
109. Member Directory, SEMICONDUCTOR IND. AsS'N, www.semiconductors.org/
about-qus/member-directory/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3L3E-
2QXD] (archived Jan. 15, 2018); see Membership Brochure, SEMICONDUCTOR IND.
ASS'N, https://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads[Membership%
20brochure%20-
%20Low%2ORes%203.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8DLT-WMU3]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018) (defining "charter members" as "semiconductor
manufacturing, design, and research companies . . . that are headquartered in the
United States").
110. Members, EICC, http://www.eiccoalition.org/about/members/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2016) [https:/perma.cc/Z7T9-LRMH] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
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These eight members are also signatories to the EICC Code of
Conduct, a set of voluntary standards governing social,
environmental, and ethical issues in the electronics industry supply
chain that references a variety of international norms and
standards.1n
The EICC Code of Conduct has a substantial impact on
semiconductor supply chain agreements, which is not surprising
when one considers what-according to the text of the Code-a
company must do to adopt the code: "[A] business shall declare its
support for the Code and actively pursue conformance to the Code
and its standards in accordance with a management system as
herein."112
Companies that have adopted the Code have taken a similar
approach to declaring their support for the Code and their efforts to
conform to the Code. For example, in the "Stakeholder Engagement"
section of its Corporate Responsibility Report, IBM first notes that it
is a founding member of the EICC; the company then says that it
"encourages its suppliers of products and services to join the group
and participate in the development and deployment of resources
aimed at driving improvements in social responsibility." It closes by
stating that the EICC Code of Conduct was recently updated and that
IBM has updated its standards to reflect any changes.113 Similarly,
Intel Corporation declared its support for the Code in the
"Management Approach" section of its Corporate Responsibility
Report, noting that it not only expects its suppliers to comply with the
EICC Code of Conduct, but that it also expects its suppliers to ensure
their suppliers abide by the Code.1
14
In addition to adhering to the EICC Code of Conduct (or perhaps
in pursuit of adhering to the EICC Code of Conduct), some of these
companies have developed their own internal standards and goals
that they in turn require their suppliers to observe. Research into
semiconductor firms' approaches to supply chain contracting for
toxics revealed restricted material lists or equivalent documents for
111. See Code of Conduct, EICC, http://www.eiccoalition.org/standards/code-of-
conduct/ (Last visited Jan. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/J7AK-8SA9] (archived Jan. 15,
2018) (consolidating standards from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO
International Labor Standards, ISO and SA standards, among many others).
112. Id.
113. Corporate Responsibility Report 2015, IBM CORP. 5,
https://www.ibm.comlannualreport/2015/assets/img/2016/02/IBM-Annual-Report-
2015.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6676-JZ5T] (archived Jan. 15,
2018) [hereinafter IBM Corporate Responsibility Report].
114. See Intel Corporate Responsibility Report: Supply Chain Responsibility,
INTEL CORP. 50, http://csrreportbuilder.intel.com/PDFfiles/CSR-2016 Full-Report.pdf
(last visited Mar. 1, 2017) [https:/perma.cc/4G84-7F5B] (archived Jan. 15, 2018)
[hereinafter Intel Corporate Responsibility Report] (follow "Read our Corporate
Responsibility Report" hyperlink).
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four companies.11 5 A fifth company, Qualcomm, listed banned
materials on the "Product. Responsibility" section of its website.
1 16
This is mentioned separately because the intended audience for the
restricted materials documents were the companies' suppliers as
opposed to the interested public, the expected audience of a public
website.1 17
Texas Instruments created a list of restricted chemicals and
materials that applies to all suppliers "who provide a chemical or
material that becomes part of [Texas Instruments]'s final product, or
packing materials used to ship [Texas Instruments]'s products."
11 8
This list includes the chemical or material name, relevant thresholds
(i.e., whether a material may contain a concentration of mercury less
than or equal to a pre-determined value or mercury is prohibited in
any concentration), and industry and regulatory references.
1 19
Like the three Annexes used to set specific goals for different
chemicals in the Stockholm Convention, Texas Instruments uses
separate tables to designate the categories and the specific chemicals
within them that are banned for any use or banned when the
chemical will become part of the Texas Instruments product.
120 The
list includes a number of pesticides and herbicides in Table N, which
is somewhat surprising because the semiconductor industry does not
rely on any such materials in its manufacturing processes.
121 The list
makes no reference to wastes of any sort,
122 precluding comparisons
to the wastes listed in the Basel Convention.
While Texas Instruments' restricted chemicals and material list
contains some chemicals listed in both the Stockholm and Rotterdam
Conventions, it also includes many additional chemicals.
123 The
115. Note that Qorvo, Inc.'s restricted material list, although located, will be
referenced only as a point of comparison and not discussed in any significant detail. It
is available at Supplier Requirements, QORVO, http://www.qorvo.com/about-
us/corporate-social-responsibility/supplier-requirements (last visited Feb. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.ccD624-4V9Y] (archived Jan. 15, 2018) (follow the "Qorvo Banned and
Restricted Substances Specification (QAL-21-1028)" hyperlink).
116. See Product Responsibility, QuALcOMM, https://www.qualcomm.com/
company/sustainability/products/product-responsibility (last visited Mar. 1, 2017)
[https://perma.ccfH4YU-UD22] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
117. I was unable to find a publicly available equivalent for Qualcomm; as such,
I did not want to equate something stated on Qualcomm's website with a document
that is binding on suppliers.
118. Texas Instruments General Quality Guidelines for SUPPLIERs, TEX.
INSTRUMENTS (last updated Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.ti.com/lit/ml/
szzq076j/szzq076j.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.ce/48WC-7FA2]
(archived Jan. 31, 2018).
119. TI Restricted Chemicals and Materials List, TEX. INSTRUMENTS (Sept. 18,
2007), https://wpl.ext.ti.comlccms/docs/649416
9 .pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2018)
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partial overlap suggests that neither the Stockholm Convention nor
the Rotterdam Convention influenced Texas Instruments' list of
restricted chemicals and materials. Additionally, the restricted
chemicals and materials list is part of a larger document called
"Texas Instruments General Quality Guidelines for SUPPLIERs,"
which suggests that it is merely advisory.124 However, the Guidelines,
excerpted below, state otherwise:
Suppliers must provide updates to their certificates of compliance to the latest
[Texas Instruments Restricted Chemicals and Materials] list, including yearly
3rd party test reports for the [Restriction of Hazardous Substances] 6
substances of [lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, polybrominated
biphenyl, and polybrominated diphenyl ethers]. TI also requires testing for
[chlorine] and [bromine] for non-metal material sets to check for [certain
contaminants]. All other restricted chemicals are verified through material
declarations and/or compliance statements from these suppliers.1 2 5
The various mechanisms that Texas Instruments uses to hold
suppliers accountable-ongoing updates to ensure compliance with
the most recent company standards, testing for contaminants, and
verification through other means-demonstrate that the guidelines,
and, more specifically, the list of restricted materials and chemicals
are, in fact, binding.
Intel Corporation, another semiconductor industry giant, has a
similar list called the "Environmental Product Content Specification
for Suppliers & Outsourced Manufacturers."126 In the "Purpose &
Scope" section, Intel describes the document as follows: "[the
Environmental Product Content Specification for Suppliers &
Outsourced Manufacturers] is intended to define environmental
requirements for Intel suppliers and outsourced manufacturers."1 27
The scope of the document's application is simple: "[t]he . . . material
declaration will be required from suppliers for all components, piece
parts, assemblies and final products."128
Much like Texas Instruments' Restricted Chemicals and
Materials List and the three annexes used to set specific goals for
different chemicals in the Stockholm Convention, Intel's document
breaks down the restrictions on chemical usage in manufacturing into
separate tiers: materials that are outright prohibited for use in
manufacturing (Table 1 of the document); and materials that are
124. See Texas Instruments General Quality Guidelines for SUPPLIERs, supra
note 118.
125. Id. at 8.
126. Environmental Product Content Specification for Suppliers & Outsourced
Manufacturers, INTEL CORP., https://supplier.intel.com/EHS/EnvironmentalProduct
ContentSpecification.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3ZPR-G6VG]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018).
127. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
128. Id. (emphasis added).
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prohibited for use in the manufacturing of parts or products on behalf
of Intel (i.e., outsourced manufacturing) (Table 2 of the document).
1 29
Intel's list also includes "Intel-Specific Requirements."
1 3 0 The
categories include: (1) reportable, under which chemicals that are not
currently banned or controlled but are likely to become banned or
voluntarily phased out or chemicals that have an impact on the end-
of-life management of the finished product must be communicated to
Intel; (2) controlled, under which chemicals may only be used for
limited, specified purposes; and (3) prohibited, under which
substances "shall not be intentionally added to materials used in Intel
products and equipment in the restricted application," among other
more specific categories.13 1 Unsurprisingly, Intel's list does not
contain wastes of any sort; thus, like Texas Instruments' Guideline, it
cannot be compared to the wastes listed in the Basel Convention.
There is no question that Intel's standard is obligatory. The use
of the terms "requirements" and "require" alone indicate that
compliance with the document is non-negotiable. The requirement
that the document be referenced in a supplier's contract and
purchasing agreement documents confirms this presumption.132
IBM Corporation presents similar information regarding
materials and substances that are prohibited from or restricted in its
products. IBM's Baseline Environmental Requirements for Supplier
Deliverables to IBM "establishes baseline environmental
requirements for all Deliverables where this specification is
referenced in a Statement of Work, print, contract or other
procurements documents."33 As with Intel, IBM's requirements
apply when referenced in contractual materials.
134 In addition, IBM's
Baseline Environmental Requirements clearly states that the
company maintains additional requirements in other documents.'
3 It
further provides that when multiple documents provide different
restrictions on one chemical or substance in the same application, the
most restrictive requirements apply.'36 While some of this may seem
self-evident, by clearly laying out terms that apply any time this
document is referenced in procurement materials, IBM is eliminating
opportunities for suppliers to plead ignorance and is, therefore,
129. See id. at 4.
130. See id. at 6.
131. See id.
132. See id. Under the subheading "Documentation," it reads: "This document
shall be referenced in the contract & the purchasing agreement document." Id.
133. Baseline Environmental Requirements for Supplier Deliverables to IBM,
IBM 4, http://www.ibm.com/ibmlenvironment/products/46g3772-oct2016.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cclRQJ9-JCAVI (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
134. See id. at 7.
135. See id. at 4 (noting that "IBM maintains environmental and/or related
requirements in other specifications, contracts, or procurement documents").
136. See id.
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increasing the likelihood that suppliers will comply with its
standards.
The actual requirements listed in IBM's standard are similar to
those prescribed by the corresponding Texas Instruments and Intel
documents. Table 1 of IBM's standard describes chemicals that are
"[p]rohibited from use in hardware deliverables, parts, products,
chemicals, mixtures, substances, and preparations."3 7 The specific
prohibition for each chemical is listed in Table 1,138 which again
mimics the tiered approach used in the Stockholm Convention and in
the two aforementioned agreements. To illustrate, polybrominated
diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), commonly found in flame retardants, are
prohibited in deliverables, including chemicals.139 The column next to
hexachlorobutadiene simply reads "[p]rohibited."' 40 Table 2 of the
IBM's standard provides further prohibitions.14 1 As with Texas
Instruments' and Intel's documents, hazardous wastes are not
specifically mentioned.142
Two substances, or more generally, classes of substances, that
are regulated under the Rotterdam Convention and restricted under
all four of the internal standards-those discussed above and
Qorvo's-are asbestos and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (PFOS) and
its derivatives. Yet, the language describing the actual restrictions on
the use of these substances differs between the four companies,
though they all produce the same end result. To illustrate, in Texas
Instrument's Restricted Chemicals and Material List, asbestos
appears in a table titled, "Manufacturers threshold based on
customer requirements" with the notation, "No exceptions."143 The
exact meaning of this language is unclear, and it is not further
explained elsewhere.
Intel and IBM both use the term "prohibited" to describe their
restrictions on asbestos use, which seems to unambiguously ban the
use of asbestos.144 Intel, however, defines the term "prohibited," to
mean that asbestos should not be "intentionally added."145 The
adjacent column in the Intel table confirms the interpretation, noting
137. See id. at 9-15.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 14.
140. See id. at 11.
141. See id. at 17-20 (listing substances that are "prohibited in Substances,
Mixtures, Preparations, Field Use Materials, and Chemical Product Supplies" and
providing "example legal citations").
142. See id.
143. See TI Restricted Chemicals and Materials List, supra note 119, at 2.
144. See Environmental Product Content Specification for Suppliers &
Outsourced Manufacturers, supra note 126, at 6; see also Baseline Environmental
Requirements for Supplier Deliverables to IBM, supra note 133, at 9.
145. See Environmental Product Content Specification for Suppliers &
Outsourced Manufacturers, supra note 126, at 6.
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the reporting threshold for asbestos is "[ilntentionally added."
14 6
Qorvo-whose standard was not discussed above-describes its
restriction on asbestos with the phrase, "No intentional use," which
appears to mimic Intel's restriction, at least as the term "prohibited"
is defined.14 7 This variation in language between standards
demonstrates how small deviations between company standards
might create confusion for suppliers.
The failure of the aforementioned standards to address
hazardous waste is not surprising. Companies utilize these standards
to police the materials and components sent to them for use in the
manufacture of their products. Wastes are not utilized in
semiconductor manufacturing and so the standards do not govern
them.148 As such, it is difficult to say how, or if, the Basel Convention
is relevant to the semiconductor industry. Semiconductor
manufacturing processes certainly generate hazardous wastes that
must be disposed of,149 but it seems highly unlikely that firms that
flaunt their commitment to socially and environmentally responsible
behavior would ship their waste internationally to dispose of it.1
5 0
Many firms self-regulate their disposal of hazardous waste by setting
standards that govern the allowable disposal or treatment methods
for these wastes, likely in an effort to ensure compliance with
applicable waste disposal laws and to continue their pursuit of
sustainable practices. For instance, Intel Corporation developed a set
of environmental goals with a deadline of the year 2020, including to
"[a]chieve zero chemical waste to landfill."1t5 While this does not
reveal how the Basel Convention might come into play in the
semiconductor industry, it does tee up a question that could be
explored in greater detail in a separate Note.
In addition to creating goals for themselves, these companies, as
shown above, dedicate ample resources to generating and
146. See id.
147. See Supplier Requirements, supra note 115.
148. See supra Part II (describing the chemicals used in semiconductor
manufacturing).
149. See supra Part II (noting generation of hazardous wastes during
semiconductor manufacturing).
150. See, e.g., Pollution Prevention, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/ibm/
environment/pollution/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cclN4VU-R83A]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018) ("Of the total 1,360 metric tons of hazardous waste IBM
generated worldwide in 2016, 65 percent (by weight) was recycled, 18 percent was sent
directly to IBM to suitably regulated landfills, 14 percent was sent for incineration, and
3 percent was sent off-site for treatment."); Sustainability: Environmental
Responsibility: Materials Management, TEX. INSTRTMENTS, http://www.ti.com/
corp/docs/csr/materials-management.htm1 (last visited Jan. 9, 2018)
[https://perma.cclR8WB-PH4C] (archived Jan. 15, 2018). ("We [] do not ship hazardous
waste, as defined in the Basel Convention, across international boundaries.")
151. See Intel Sets 2020 Environmental Goals, INTEL CORP. (May 17, 2012),
https://newsroom.intel.cominews-releases/intel-sets-2020-environmental-goals/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/GB3N-U4YN] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
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maintaining restrictions on the chemicals used in their
manufacturing processes. It is no surprise that they hold their
suppliers accountable through audits and reviews, company-funded
consulting, and increased engagement between the company's
management and the supplier's management.152 In addition to the
accountability tools Texas Instruments details in its Restricted
Materials and Chemicals List, 5 3 other companies have developed
additional ways to hold their suppliers accountable. For example,
Intel set a goal to "[c]omplete or review an on-site audit for each of
[the company's] Top 75 suppliers by the end of 2016."154 The
company, which met this goal for 2016, identified the suppliers that
are not meeting its requirements in its Corporate Responsibility
Report.155 Though it can hardly be said that a corporate social
responsibility report is widely read, the topic is often newsworthy-
when companies' suppliers exceed expectations and even more so
when they come up significantly short-so poorly performing
suppliers may feel pressure to improve performance when their
names appear on a list of "at risk" suppliers.156
Even firms that produce internal toxics standards above and
beyond existing regulatory requirements remain concerned about the
potential impact future regulations may have on their companies.
Texas Instruments expressed concern to its shareholders in its most
recent publicly available annual report.157 If they have notice before
such requirements are implemented, companies could preemptively
address some of this apprehension by creating a category similar to
Intel's "reportable" classification, which requires suppliers to notify
Intel if they use chemicals that are likely to become banned. 18
152. See, e.g., Intel Corporate Responsibility Report, supra note 114, at 65.
153. See supra note 125.
154. See Intel Corporate Responsibility Report, supra note 114, at 52 (noting
that its "supplier audits are based on EICC Code of Conduct requirements for third-
party audits and internal criteria defined by Intel management").
155. See id. at 65.
156. See, e.g., Ben Sin, Latest Foxconn Worker Deaths Build Case for Apple to
Move Operations from China, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2016, 12:38 A.M.),
http://www.forbes.comsitesfbensin2016/08/22/the-real-cost-of-the-iphone-7-more-
foxconn-worker-deaths/#67526a2861b7 (last visited Jan. 31, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/A5DP-5WW6] (archived Jan. 31 2018); Rick Wartzman, How Intel
Gets Social Responsibility Just Right, TIME (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://business.time.comi/2014 /01/15/how-intel-gets-social-responsibility-just-right/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2018) [perma.cclJEX3-4ZC9] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
157. See 2015 Annual Report, TEx. INSTRUMENTS 11 (2015), http://www.ti.com
corp/docs/investorrelations/annual reports.html [https://perma.cc/A6H4-DN7W]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018) [hereinafter TI Annual Report] (select "2015 (PDF, 1.0 MB)"
hyperlink) (cautioning that legal developments may significantly impact it "if such
laws and regulations . . . require the addition or elimination of a raw material or
process to or from our current manufacturing processes").
158. See supra note 126, at 6 (describing the function of Intel Corporation's
"Reportable" category).
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4. Summary of Private Environmental Governance in the
Semiconductor Industry
Private environmental governance plays a significant role in
semiconductor supply chains. Many firms create binding standards
for their suppliers that are more restrictive than existing
governmental regulations. Additionally, firms take steps to ensure
their suppliers are actually conforming to these standards. It is
unknown how companies formulate their lists of restricted and
banned substances. It is clear, however, that companies are-at least
in part-building upon the restrictions in the environmental
agreements introduced above.
V. METHODOLOGY & FINDINGS
The rather simple methodology used to generate this analysis
was ultimately sufficient;159 as it turns out, companies impose
standards governing the conduct of their suppliers with regard to
toxics through restricted materials lists and other roughly equivalent
documents separate from the actual agreements.
160 Company
websites served as valuable resources for this analysis because they
often provided copies of annual reports and corporate responsibility
(or sustainability) reports-especially as company filings were not
available.161 Supplier documents, such as Texas Instruments'
Restricted Chemicals & Materials list and IBM's Baseline
Environmental Requirements for Supplier Deliverables to IBM,
provided comprehensive and understandable information regarding
company expectations of suppliers.162 Table 1, shown below,
summarizes how companies are communicating their efforts to
regulate their supply chains to the public and their shareholders.
The table uses Yes (Y), No (N), or Not Found (NF) to indicate
whether relevant supply chain topics appear in a particular document
or report. More specifically, Yes does not reflect merely that one of the
search terms or phrases appeared in the text; Yes indicates that a
word or phrase that is relevant to the appearance of toxics appears in
159. Originally, I intended for this analysis to focus on the supply chain
agreements themselves; however, I ran multiple searches for supply agreements using
the "SEC EDGAR Filings, Combined" filter on LexisAdvance, but my attempts were
not fruitful. I attempted to replicate the methodology described by Professor
Vandenbergh in The New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 54, at 936 n.109.
160. See, e.g., Baseline Environmental Requirements for Supplier Deliverables to
IBM, supra note 133.
161. The methodology for acquiring information from company websites was
rather simple: I performed a series of Google searches where I entered [company name]
annual report, [company name] sustainability report, and lastly [company name] toxic
supply chain.
162. See TIRestricted Chemicals and Materials List, supra note 119.
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supply chain agreements.163 The corresponding footnotes provide
both the source of the information and, where appropriate, an excerpt
or summary of the text from the company's annual report or corporate
responsibility (or in some cases, sustainability) report explaining the
relevant or noteworthy information.
Table 1. Summarizing how companies are communicating their
efforts to regulate their supply chains to the public and to their
shareholders
EICC Suppliers/ Annual Corporate




AMD 165  Y NF N Y
Analog Devices166  Y > 2,000 / N N
NF
Global Y NF NF N
Foundries1 6 7
IBM Y 14,000 / N Y
Corporation1 6 8  100
163. Note that a general discussion of supply chain logistics or finances in an
annual report would not be sufficient to warrant crediting the document or report with
declaring support for regulating toxics in the supply chain.
164. Members, supra note 110.
165. Annual Report 2015, AMD, http://ir.amd.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=
74093&p=irol-reportsannual (last visited Jan. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/N3YE-DZH4]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018); Corporate Responsibility Report 2014-2015, AMD,
http://www.amd.com/ Documents/2014-2015-Corporate-Responsibility-Report.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cclLV7D-YX32] (archived Jan. 15, 2018)
(describing its susceptibility to disruptions from its supply chain and its efforts to
minimize those risks).
166. Annual Report 2015, ANALOG DEVICES, http://files.shareholder.com/
downloads/ADI/3706539717x0x872073/9B336071-EF60-43AF-9E98-A424EEF6634C/
2015 AnalogDevices ARFINAL for Posting.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/46WT-356E] (archived Jan. 15, 2018) (noting that its contract with
suppliers contain "additional EHS compliance standards") (emphasis added);
Sustainability Report 2014-2015, ANALOG DEVICES, http://www.analog.comlmedial
en/Other/About-ADI/Sustainability/Sustainability-Report2o14-2015.pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cclVP8Z-ZCJ3] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
167. Corporate Responsibility Report, GLOB. FOUNDRIES 12 (2013),
http://www.globalfoundries.com/docs/default-source/PDF/globalfoundries-corporate-
responsibility-report-9-23-final.pdfsfvrsn=6 (last visited Jan. 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Z4PJ-WFPF] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
168. Annual Report 2015, IBM, https://wvw.ibm.com/annualreport/2015/
assets/img/2016/02/IBM-Annual-Report-2015.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/CY5L-NUAC] (archived Jan. 15, 2018); IBM Corporate Responsibility
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Intel Y 19,000 / N N
Corporation1 6 9  100
Intersil1 7 0  NF N N
Lansdale NF NF NF
Semiconductor
Inc.
Maxim Integrated See FN171  NF N
1 7 2  NF
Micron Y NF /30 N Y
Technology, Inc.
173
ON Y NF N Y
Semiconductors
1 7 4
Qorvo175  Y NF N NF
Report, supra note 113, at 12 (describing a tool that allows it to identify in real time
which parts are impacted by expiring exemptions for the E.U. RoHS Directive).
169. Annual Report 2015, INTEL CORP., https://www.intc.comlinvestor-
relations/financials-and-filings/annual-reports-and-proxy/default. aspx (last visited Jan.
22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/T2S7-VDZNJ (archived Jan. 15, 2018) (select "2015 Annual
Report and Form 10-K' hyperlink); Intel Corporate Responsibility Report, supra note
114.
170. Annual Report, INTERSIL, http://ir.intersil.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=69
2 8 1&p=
irol-reportsannual [https://perma.cclHH5F-9LTF] (archived Jan. 15, 2018) (from the
Annual Reports page, select "2015 Annual Report."). I was unable to obtain a URL for
Intersil's Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR") Policy because upon selecting the link
among Google results, the PDF downloaded.
171. Maxim is not listed as a member on the EICC's website, but the company
touts that its Code of Corporate Social Responsibility "is aligned with the ... EICC
Code of Conduct." See Corporate Responsibility, MAXIM INTEGRATED PRODUCTS,
http://investor.maximintegrated.com/corporate-responsibility/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2017) [https://perma.cc/VBA3-T7AY] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
172. Annual Report, MAXIM INTEGRATED PRODS., INC., 2016,
http://s21.q4cdn.com/176677460/files/doc-financials/Annual-
Proxy/20161FY16_Form10-K.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EC22-
QV7V] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
173. Annual Report Form 10-K, Fiscal Year 2015, MICRON TECH., INC.,
http://investors.micron.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD=7
23125-16-269&CIK=723125 (last
visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/H8RN-3ST9] (archived Jan. 15, 2018) (noting
that the company has made "significant investments in supply chain risk monitoring
and management o mitigate [associated risks]"); Sustainability Report 2016, MICRON
TECH., INC., https://www.micron.com/about/our-commitment/sustainability (last visited
Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3QUT-JP32] (archived Jan. 15, 2018) (describing "a
rigorous chemical review process that ensures only approved chemicals reach our
facilities [and] prevents banned or restricted chemicals from reaching our operations").
174. Annual Report 2015, ON SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION (search "ON
Semiconductor Corporation Annual Report" on Google.com, select link); Corporate
Sustainability Report 2015, ON SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION,
http://www.onsemi.comlpub_1ink/Collateral/BRD8084-D.PDF.
175. QRVO Annual Report 2016, QORVO INC., http://files.shareholder.com/
downloads/TQNT/3974243615xOx897350/DDCDAFFB-7442-4B2C-99C2-F5A8CB1
295A
B/QRVO_2016_- AnnuaLReport.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W7P3-
KWD5] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
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Qualcomm176  Y NF N N
Rochester NF NF NF
Electronics
Texas Y > 12,000 / N Y
Instruments7 7  NF
Although a systematic analysis is not possible based on the
available data, the publicly available supply chain contracting
information from Texas Instruments, Intel Corporation, and IBM
Corporation suggests that American semiconductor manufacturers
are creating internal standards to fill gaps left by the United States'
failure to implement international standards governing toxic
chemicals. Company documents intended for suppliers provided the
most substantive information for this Note. While it is impossible to
say what specific provisions American semiconductor firm supply
chain agreements include based on this analysis, these documents
that purport to bind suppliers appear to function as addenda to
supply chain agreements. Thus, it was possible to reach substantive
conclusions for the purposes of this Note without access to the supply
chain agreements themselves. These documents definitively
demonstrate that American semiconductor firms are taking steps to
internally regulate their supply chains.
A careful reading of Texas Instruments', Intel's, and IBM's
restricted chemicals lists reveals some consistency with regard to
chemicals listed and the specific restrictions on them.1 7 8 However, the
lists are far from identical. For example, Texas Instruments' list is
much more comprehensive than those of Intel and IBM. While
comprehensiveness is generally a point of strength, it does not
necessarily make Texas Instruments' list more useful for its
suppliers. For instance, Texas Instruments' list includes pesticides,
which are not used in semiconductor manufacturing. Perhaps this list
is given to every supplier that contracts with Texas Instruments,
176. Annual Report of Form 10-K 2016, QUALCOMM,
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/QCOMJ3991380359xOx915400/CD7lF5A8-
BEAA-4EEE-B385-2CD75B48B9D3/2016_Annual Report Form_10-K.pdf (last visited
Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/JF25-E8RA] (archived Jan. 15, 2018); 2015 Qualcomm
Sustainability Report, QUALCOMM, https://www.qualcomm.com/company/
sustainability/reporting (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/27HD-Q34H]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018).
177. TI Annual Report, supra note 157; 2015 Corporate Citizenship Report,
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 62-65 (2015), http://www.ti.com/corp/does/csr/downloads/CCR-
2015Report-PRINT.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/27HD-Q34H]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018).
178. See TI Restricted Chemicals and Materials List, supra note 119;
Environmental Product Content Specification for Suppliers & Outsourced
Manufacturers, supra note 126; Baseline Environmental Requirements for Supplier
Deliverables to IBM, supra note 133.
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including those providing landscaping or extermination services,
which could explain its overbreadth. However, such a comprehensive
list is certainly more cumbersome for suppliers of specific materials
than would be a list containing only materials used in the
manufacturing process.
VI. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE REGULATION OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY?
As this semiconductor case study demonstrates, individual
companies in at least one industry have used private governance to
create uniform standards for their particular suppliers across
international regimes. This has perhaps been motivated by a desire to
reduce the risk of noncompliance with foreign laws, tort liability,
reputational harm, and the time each firm's compliance department
spends tracking developments in environmental regulations across
the globe. However, by adopting these firm-specific standards,
individual semiconductor firms are essentially passing the problem
they endeavored to solve for themselves on to their suppliers.
Suppliers that contract with multiple semiconductor companies must
meet the requirements imposed on them by each individual company.
While some of these standards are uniform, minute variations in
language, which may be amplified in translation, and significant
differences in the restrictions placed on certain chemicals mean that
suppliers must now either track the differences in requirements or
modify their practices to consistently comply with the most stringent
requirements. Such requirements will, of course, trickle down to the
suppliers' suppliers, requiring them to make the same choice.
Developing uniform industry standards to govern chemicals in
supply chain contracting, perhaps coordinated by the EEIC,17
9 would
lessen the burden on semiconductor industry suppliers.1
80 Uniform
industry standards would not completely eliminate the problem, since
some companies might elect to regulate certain chemicals that others
do not in anticipation of future regulatory developments or based on
179. See Responsible Business Alliance, History, http://www.responsible
business.org/about/history/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [https://perma.ccK6JL-D72E]
(archived Jan. 15, 2018) (describing the EICC and the role it currently plays in driving
environmentally and socially responsible behavior).
180. For a discussion of the potential chilling effect of antitrust laws on
companies collaborating on social responsibility issues, see Inara Scott, Antitrust and
Socially Responsible Collaboration: A Chilling Combination?, 53 AM. BUS. L. J. 97
(2016). This Note did not specifically explore the suppliers each semiconductor firm
utilizes. If a particular supplier works with only one firm, the burden of all of these
unique standards will be nonexistent. If, however, a supplier works with all fourteen
charter members of the SEMICONDUCTOR IND. Ass'N, then the burden will be
significant.
[VOL.51:591622
THE GAP-FILLING ROLE OF PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
company policy. Further, variations in manufacturing processes
naturally lead to some difference in chemical usage between
semiconductor manufacturers. These minor differences could be
addressed in appendices to any uniform standards the industry
adopts. Such appendices may need to be kept confidential to prevent
violation of antitrust laws.
Further, instead of generating uniform standards specific to the
semiconductor industry, semiconductor firms could work across
multiple industries to develop uniform standards applicable to all
American companies or organizations. The Sustainability
Consortium, an existing organization with sustainability-driven
members representing an array of industries, is in a prime position to
coordinate such an endeavor.181 A national set of standards would
certainly make a statement, but the approach has limitations as well.
For instance, many substances that would be covered would only be
relevant to one or a few industries.
Uniform standards are ideal from the supplier perspective
because they limit the amount of information suppliers will need to
sort through, understand, and comply with. Alternatively, if the
industry is unable to reach such a solution, a database of information
detailing firm-specific standards could be another viable, though
perhaps less favorable, choice. Google and HBN's Portico database
could serve as a model for such an approach.82 This type of database
would certainly be complex, but, at a minimum, it would compile all
of the information in one place. This would obviate the need for
individual suppliers to create their own repositories for the
information and eliminate small variations in terminology, thus
simplifying the standards for suppliers.
VII. CONCLUSION
The multitude of supply chain contracting requirements on
toxics across the semiconductor industry seems to indicate that they
are filling a gap created-at least in part-by the United States'
failure to implement international environmental agreements. The
industry's present approach is, however, filling the gap with a mosaic
of standards, and both manufacturers and suppliers would be better
served by a uniform approach. A uniform set of semiconductor
industry standards, or even broader American manufacturer or
company standards, would alleviate much of the burden currently
imposed on suppliers; these approaches do not, however, come
without complications. One potential alternative, the development of
181. SUSTAINABILITY CONSORTIUM, https://www.sustainabilityconsortium.org
(last visited Mar. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cc/JC88-GZNB] (archived Jan. 15, 2018).
182. See supra note 75.
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a database detailing each semiconductor firm's standards, would
decrease the burden of individual firms' standards on suppliers, but
would likely be a less effective solution for burdened suppliers.
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